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The ANC has lost its majority — but is that really cause for celebration?

  • Kwande Bam
  • Jun 5, 2024
  • 10 min read


As the dust begins to settle on the 2024 National and Provincial elections, the expectation that this would be the first time South Africans emerge from the polls without an ANC majority has been rather spectacularly realised. While pollsters, political analysts, and the public alike foresaw the party dipping below 50%, many are seemingly surprised by the outcome: the ANC sitting at just above 40%. Leading up to the elections, many, including myself, welcomed the prospect of a weaker ANC. A multitude of corruption scandals, high crime and unemployment levels, unsatisfactory service delivery, and economic stagnation have dominated the narrative surrounding the liberation movement for at least the last decade of its 30-year majority rule. We saw this momentous electoral shift as a powerful symbol that South Africa’s democracy was indeed stronger than the party that largely established it. We hoped that as politicians finally begin to internalise that they serve at the mercy of the people, we would be one step closer to realising the ambitious promises of 1994. However, as we celebrate one aspect of our democracy’s maturation, we must be keenly aware that it now faces a new, potentially more dangerous threat: populism.


Much has been said about the possible reasons behind the rise of uMkhonto weSizwe Party — the few-month-old formation led by former president Jacob Zuma — to being the third-largest party in South Africa. Its roughly 14,5% result almost doubles the share that the next best performing new party, fellow ANC breakaway COPE, achieved in 2009.  The party's campaign and eventual success have largely been concentrated in KwaZulu-Natal and the Zulu-speaking regions of southern Mpumalanga. A simple glance at the IEC results dashboard shows the pink voting districts, representing those won by MK, clustered around this region. This, alongside the fact that their performance in other provinces is roughly cognate to their Zulu-speaking populations, has been used to suggest that their success can be explained by their leveraging of Zulu nationalism. Although this view is an oversimplification of the many complex factors that led to MK’s success, it is evident that most of its support base is Zulu-speaking, and that in part contributed to its seismic rise. However, many of those voters were indeed motivated by amongst other things, the party's contempt of established norms, its support for tradition, and Zuma’s cult of personality — all features of the populist playbook.


Ethnic mobilisation has however been a feature of South African politics since at least the South African or Anglo-Boer war of the late 19th and early 20th century. The political and economic divide between the British and Afrikaners in the aftermath of the war, as well as the memory of the atrocities committed against Afrikaner women and children as prisoners of war resulted in tension between the two groups that persisted even after unification in 1910. Afrikaner nationalism therefore inspired significant political and economic mobilisation throughout the 20th century. The ascent of the National Party to power in 1948 and later the transition into a republic in 1961, demonstrate pivotal political outcomes that can be explained to a great degree by ethnic (in this case Afrikaner) nationalism. Among the many crimes of the NP’s apartheid, is the intentional division of Black people along tribal lines. The separate development doctrine espoused by the regime was not only a tool of white supremacy but also a manifestation of the divide-and-conquer strategy that was a prominent part of the colonial repertoire. The creation of tribal homelands and the stoking of violence amongst Black urban residents ensured that ethnic identity politics became a mainstay of the South African political landscape. 


Within this climate, the ANC emerged as a national movement that largely resisted the urge to mobilise on ethnic nationalist or populist lines. Although some of its most famed leaders, Tambo, Sisulu, Mandela, and Mbeki garnered strong support from Xhosa-speaking populations, it has maintained a commitment to being an explicitly national organisation with support bases in all 9 of South Africa’s current provinces. Even judging by its senior position-holders, albeit a single element of the picture, figures like Motlanthe, Ramaphosa, Duarte, and even Malema — all non-Xhosa and even non-Nguni — are examples of this outlook. Looking further, the use of multiple languages in its songs and campaigns, as well as the rotation of where it hosts its January 8th birthday celebration, again are symbols of this national view. Equally important is that the ANC has been cautious to avoid much of the populist rhetoric that we have seen carry electoral weight this election. The policy positions of the party concerning hot-topic issues such as LGBTQ+ rights and immigration have remained measured, even in the face of electoral decline. MK and the Patriotic Alliance, another well-performing populist party have made it clear that a notable chunk of South Africa’s electorate is not as progressive as it once seemed, especially when meaningful economic progress does not materialise. The ANC’s unique privilege as our country’s central liberation movement thus gave it the breathing room to secure broad support, without mobilising based on fear, nationalism or populism. Instead of calls for mass deportations or mandatory military service, the ANC’s vast catalogue of struggle songs and callbacks to national heroes were, for a long time, enough for us to continue believing in the ‘Rainbow Nation’. 


One is reminded of Julius Nyerere’s defence of the one-party state made while president of a newly independent Tanzania. He argued that as part of the post-independence nation-building process, the single liberation movement-turned-party prevented the abuse of Western-style democracy to espouse ethnic division and distract from developmental priorities. The role Nyerere saw for his TANU was thus the same as what he would have given to the ANC.  The premise of Nyerere’s contention, however, is that the single party would maintain its commitment to not only nation-building but also the economic development that the African people believed that independence would bring. This is the great pity that the ANC’s fall from grace represents. Instead of caring for the organisation’s legacy with the respect and reverence which it deserves, the contemporary leaders of the ANC, especially since Zuma, have dragged its name through the mud. Many have displayed outright contempt for the people that their predecessors fought so painfully for and have used their monopoly on power to rob the people of years, potentially even decades, of material progress.


Consequently, the case study of the African National Congress proves Nyerere to be half correct. His belief that the liberation movement would remain benevolent meant that he never really contended with the possibility of TANU, or the ANC, no longer serving the interests of the people. The optimism of the time, which was almost to the point of naivety, can perhaps excuse this significant oversight, but sadly means that we are left without guidance from one of our continent’s wisest ancestors on how to approach such a reality. The fact that most of the ANC’s electoral losses can be attributed to its breakaways, the EFF and MK, does however signal that the division Nyerere warned of, fuelled by frustration at unemployment, poverty, and corruption, is taking hold in South Africa's political realm. 

These two parties, formed by ousted leaders of the ANC, have used grievances with the liberation movement’s broad-church approach to amass sizeable bases. The EFF, led by the former ANC Youth League president Julius Malema and spokesperson Floyd Shivambu, emerged because of frustration with the ANC’s centre-left and at times conservative economic doctrine. The red berets’ calls for land expropriation without compensation and the nationalisation of mines and banks, as well as its subtle militancy, attracted many, especially young people. The principled stances they have taken on LGBTQ+ rights and particularly on immigration have, unfortunately, cost them electorally, and paved the way for explicitly populist formations to capture some of their support. In came MK, which, rather than from any major objection to the policy direction of the ANC, was formed to address Zuma's personal grievances with the party and his general sense that it had lost direction. He seems to never have fully accepted his recalling as President of the Republic amidst state capture allegations and has employed every populist tool available to him — nationalism, hatred for minorities, and election conspiracies — to execute his vengeance. 


It should concern us all that South Africans have not yet found a suitable alternative to the unifying political home that the ANC once represented. The longtime official opposition, the DA, has failed to grow beyond the 20-or-so percent share it has held since 2014. It has struggled to resonate with anywhere close to a majority of South Africans because of its reluctance to consistently have Black leadership and its reverence for the free market; despite brandishing its supposedly good governance record. Unless it dramatically shifts direction, risking its core base, it will never be the solution the country needs. In this election, new parties Build One South Africa and especially RISE Mzansi have campaigned to be the new big tent that South Africa’s lively political discourse happens under. I believe in the potential of such a mission and thus, full disclosure, one of these parties, RISE Mzansi, earned my vote. 


However, on the back of their electoral performance, each gaining two seats in the National Assembly, it is clear that the credible ANC alternative will not be built in a day, or a single election cycle. The leaders of these parties, as well as others with a degree of ideological proximity, ought to show the political maturity that establishing a broadly supported grouping requires. For one, the humility required to be part of a movement bigger than its personalities is a fundamental part of this process. One of the ANC’s key strengths has been that it has consistently allowed its members to elect fresh leadership and that although personalities have played a role, the party has always been paramount. I’m not the first to call for consolidation, and I’d prefer for a few reasons for it to be around RISE. Chiefly, is that they have a larger core of leaders and activists outside of their main party leader (and that BOSA literally features Maimane’s name in its official registration). As a prerequisite though, a profound acceptance of the fact that those who today sow the seeds might never hold public office or even go to parliament is needed. In a country of many great leaders, some are inevitably going to have to be led. This presents a kind of chicken and egg problem, where for the movement to grow, this sacrifice must be made, but at the same time, it is incredibly difficult to make while it is still small. However, with strong internal democratic processes which give a clear mandate to whoever the current leaders may be, such issues of human nature can be overcome. 


Another aspect of establishing a big tent is precisely the need to be big. The new parties have justifiably invested their campaign resources primarily in urban areas and on social media. It is the best way to reach the most amount of people, and therefore a wise decision in the initial stages. It’s likely obvious to them though, that a true successor to the ANC will have its presence felt in every corner of the country. In almost every family, community, workplace or place of worship there is a dedicated ANC comrade who acts as an extension of the party in the absence of its senior leaders. Of course, the ANC has benefited from its access to state resources, such that through the awarding of tenders and cadre deployment, these foot soldiers can be compensated for their efforts. Despite this reality, I believe that if people are adequately convinced by the vision, and sufficiently included in the decision-making processes of the organisation, the same levels of dedication can be achieved without access to or abuse of the state’s resources. The national conferences conducted by the ANC therefore are not only an impressive display of scale, but also how every branch member, who could one day be a delegate, feels connected to and part of the movement, even without ever holding any office on its behalf. I thus urge the shiny new centre-left movement to avoid the perceptions associated with its slick, corporate-like image and continue welcoming into its ranks, more members representing ideological, socioeconomic, and location diversity. 


Finally, a party must be a political home in the truest sense of the world. It should be based on the understanding that although there may be fiercely debated policy disagreements or different leaders representing marginally different interests, at the end of the day, as members, we wear the same colours, sing the same songs, and have the same underlying vision for our country. A family in a home can disagree, and indeed be transparent about the fact that they disagree, but at the same time not allow disagreements anything short of fundamental, to divide them. As the new progressive movement, whether in or outside of party politics, we can benefit from a similar kind of pragmatism. Crucially, this must not be confused with being unprincipled. Once we come together on the basis of a shared goal, we ought to have the humility and clarity of mind to overcome the challenge of integrating our various outlooks into a collective plan for this country. For us to forge the true ANC alternative, we need to coalesce around a suitable political vehicle, the bus, as the analogy goes, and agree upon the exact route to the destination we all hope to arrive at, while we’re on board. 


The growth of populism and the cult of personality that has been the key story of this election demonstrates the urgency of developing and implementing meaningful solutions. The fact that our institutions survived yet another onslaught should not allow us to feel a sense of comfort or return to normalcy. The fact that close to 15%, or 17% counting the PA, of South African voters, for whatever reasons, voted for parties with open contempt and disregard for our much-celebrated institutions, and that roughly 60% of eligible voters chose not to have a say, should raise serious questions. The failure of the ANC, but also of all of us in a way, to ensure the hard-fought gains of 1994 are felt by all, has allowed dangerous forces to re-enter our politics. The truth is that two apartheid demons still terrorise our country and must, like the first, be defeated. Economic and spatial apartheid similarly need a broad, inclusive, progressive coalition to be dismantled with the meticulousness with which they were established. The ANC, sadly to some, is no longer fit for purpose, and must be replaced, as a matter of urgency with a new centre-left for South Africa to rally under. 


We will soon find out the make-up and nature of our next government, but as the noise of the election dies down, politics must not. This is a juncture that our country may not have the opportunity to return to. I want to avoid the cliché lines of “get involved in your community,” or “you have a role to play,” by simply reminding everyone of how the political branch of apartheid was not destroyed by our many heroes acting alone. They belonged to a movement which recognised that the multiple axes of oppression South Africans faced — racism, economic exploitation, sexism, the restriction of sexual and gender expression, and ableism — were all connected, reliant on one another, and thus to be dismantled, needed to be addressed by everyone. Similarly, in our understanding that unemployment, poverty, starvation, poor education, crime, climate change, the high cost of living, and the lack of adequate housing and sanitation are all part of the same machine, we must reject the relative comfort of self-interested politics.


If South Africa is to emerge stronger after celebrating 30 years of democracy with a successful election, that democracy must very quickly begin to bear fruit for everyone, not just constitutional law experts or those of us who, on social media, appreciate our ability to openly criticise those in power. It should not make us proud that the ANC has lost its grip on power if there is no credible alternative to take its place. Creating this will require sacrifice, patience, and compromise, but the end goal, demonstrating to every South African and the world that meaningful development under democracy is indeed possible, is certainly worth fighting for.





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