The Inevitable Gravity of the Broad Church
The Long-Term Logic of South African Political Consolidation: Structural Attrition and the ANC’s 2029 Restoration Strategy
In the build-up to the Local Government Elections in South Africa, the narrative that seems to be underplayed is that this election may be rather inconsequential to the ANC. Regardless of the result, they are relying on a potential belief that everyone will return to the “broad church” that is the ANC in 2029.
It is extremely important to understand that, in the scope of South African politics, there has still yet to be a body that can truly embody the diversity and range of the political spectrum under one organisation. The Mbeki-ites, who stood for neoliberal economic policy and fiscal responsibility, shared the same organisation with the South African Communist Party. ANC politics, always being defined by the leader of the time, has been home to opposing, counterintuitive, and even rebellious beliefs.
These political disputes have represented themselves over the years as personality engagements between party leaders and youth structures. The fight between former President Jacob Zuma and the then former president of the youth, and current President of the EFF, Julius Malema, pushed for more radical and revolutionary politics—particularly calls for economic freedom in our lifetime and the need to expropriate land. This led to the first congregation within the ANC to break from the “broad church” and start their own political party.
In 2013, the EFF was championed by the people of South Africa. Revolutionary greetings and red berets placed many within the youth at the footsteps of the EFF. The EFF placed itself right at the forefront of progressive politics and, on the political spectrum, positioned itself more left than the center-left-leaning ANC.
Colloquially, some even believed it was the rebranding and embodiment of the Youth League. Malema dealt the first blow to the ANC but was unable to truly topple it. Electorally, the ANC declined from 65.9% in 2009 to 62.15% in 2014. Comparatively, the EFF, in its first election, amassed 6.35%.
This indicated two things politically within South Africa: there was growing despondency developing within the political system that the EFF, in its early stages, capitalised on. Beyond taking ground from the ANC, it actually revitalised the scope and scale to which politics could be considered outside of the ANC. More importantly, even though the EFF was not part of the ANC, they still shared a similar constituency—people who cared about the same things but had different mechanisms for achieving their goals. The broad church lost, but gained overall in the wider scope of Black politics in South Africa.
Though there had been an electoral decline, it had not produced a radically different political landscape. Rather, it was a disruption of an existing sentiment within the broad church that more needed to be done, and that it needed to happen through the youth and a more radical socialist outlook. These ideas were not new to the EFF, but were already embedded within the ANC, just not given significant airtime. This marked the first dilution of the ANC majority, but not its fall into a minority party reliant on others.
Similarly, in the election year that followed in 2019, after the country had grappled with state capture and the Gupta family’s use of state institutions to facilitate widespread corruption, the same trend followed. Left and center-left politics continued to hold a 67% electoral majority in South Africa, just not concentrated within the ANC.
The ANC experienced an electoral decline of 8.4% in the 2019 election, placing them at 57.5% nationally, while the EFF continued to rise, gaining an additional 4.44%. The push for reform and alternatives outside of the ANC became significantly more necessary as the ANC became synonymous with corruption, government failure, and inefficiency. The people needed change. However, they were not upset with the ANC alone; rather, they exposed that it had failed to implement its promises, thus requiring a harsher political response.
Then, in the build-up to 2024, something interesting happened. The media underplayed and undervalued the impact that the uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MKP) would have electorally. This led many to believe that it was not a party to be taken seriously, but rather an attempt by a former president to reclaim power.
Former President Jacob Zuma has clearly outlined that the formation of the party was not intended to contest with the ANC indefinitely, but rather to force the ANC to return to its former state and restore its brilliance. This suggests that MKP voters were not non-ANC voters, but rather disgruntled ANC voters. The same logic applies: the “broad church” further fractured, yet continued to hold roughly a 64% majority of the electorate.
The ANC declined by 17.32% and fell below 50% for the first time electorally. The rise of the MKP corresponded with this shift, achieving 14.58% in its first election. Unlike the EFF, which relied on radicalism, the MKP leaned into nostalgia—a return to perceived better times pre-COVID and periods of reasonable economic growth. They did not create new constituencies but further fragmented the broad church.
Similarly, the EFF, even though it declined by 1.2%, continued to hold over 9%. Both parties felt the effect of the MKP and may have become victims of the same internal dynamics that once led to Malema’s expulsion from the ANC. The broad church had now been contested in unprecedented ways.
Yet, the ANC remained in power. It continued to dictate policy and the national outlook, both locally and internationally. Despite shifts in numbers and coalition dynamics, very little fundamentally changed.
Now, with Local Government Elections on the horizon, many analysts will call for the death of the ANC or claim this is their last chance to remain competitive. This overlooks the broader dynamic that continually drives the reformation of the broad church into a political entity capable of housing diverse ideological perspectives.
One of the more speculative concerns surrounds former President Zuma’s capacity to campaign in 2029. At 83 years old as of 2026, and with limited appearances in the build-up to the 2024 elections, there are legitimate concerns about his health and ability to re-engage the electorate.
This presents a major issue for the MKP, which relies heavily on Zuma for legitimacy and direction. There appears to be little succession planning for a post-Zuma era, and their long-term political vision remains unclear beyond his influence.
Additionally, Duduzile Zuma-Sambudla has removed herself from political viability after reportedly recruiting South Africans into a Russian mercenary group, forcing her resignation as an MP. A potential successor to the Zuma legacy has therefore become politically untenable.
Similarly, Julius Malema is awaiting sentencing following his October 2025 conviction for discharging a rifle at a 2018 rally. If sentenced to prison, he could be disqualified from running in 2029 under Section 47(e) of the Constitution, which bars individuals sentenced to more than 12 months without the option of a fine from serving in the National Assembly for five years after completing their sentence.
Within the EFF, the departures of figures such as Floyd Shivambu and Mbuyiseni Ndlozi have left a leadership vacuum. There is no clear successor capable of embodying Malema’s charismatic leadership, leaving the party vulnerable.
As internal dissatisfaction grows and members seek alternative political opportunities, the question becomes: where do they go?
It is unlikely that parties such as the Democratic Alliance, FF+, United for Change, or the IFP will fill this space. These parties lack the structural and ideological capacity to unite a broad and diverse electorate. Furthermore, their positions—particularly around social safety nets and transformation—often contrast with the foundational thinking of the ANC, making them less appealing as inclusive alternatives.
Even where the DA has governed, coalition instability has been a recurring issue. While governance in the Western Cape and Cape Town is often cited as effective, this alone does not translate into national appeal. Within the Government of National Unity, the DA has also faced challenges in implementing its policies effectively.
Even in a best-case scenario where the DA becomes the largest party, it would still require coalition partners—many of whom are more united in opposition to the DA than in cooperation with it.
This leaves one potential outcome: a reconstitution of the ANC.
In a political environment where opposition parties struggle to position themselves as a unifying force, the ANC has the opportunity to call for restoration, restructuring, and renewal of the broad church. This is where figures like Patrice Motsepe emerge as potential unifiers.
Motsepe’s public image is one of unity—across business, sport, religion, and traditional leadership. He engages with South African society in visible yet understated ways, while maintaining strong international and economic ties. This positions him as a potential figure capable of leading a renewal of the ANC—not as a dying institution, but as one seeking to reunify a fractured electorate.
The ANC, therefore, may not need immediate action. Instead, it can afford to wait as opposition figures face legal, political, and personal challenges. This creates space for the ANC to reposition itself for the future.
Finally, it is important to note that President Ramaphosa’s decision to initiate an inquiry in the lead-up to an election year appears counterintuitive. It risks exposing wrongdoing within the ANC itself.
However, as the state acts on the commission’s findings and begins prosecuting those implicated, it positions the ANC as the party attempting to resolve systemic corruption. Whether this leads to meaningful accountability or further delays remains to be seen.
Either way, it allows the ANC to frame itself as a vehicle for renewal—bringing in new leadership, distancing itself from past failures, and attempting to reunite its broad and diverse base under one umbrella. The vision remains the same: to be the “broad church” that accommodates all.